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This article analyses the role of local dynamics on trade unions’ mobilisation capacity at the 
national level, with a focus on the wildcat strikes in the metal sector in Bursa, a city in north-west 
Turkey, from 2012 to 2016. It studies to what extent local dynamics such as alliances with local 
branches of political parties, workplace demonstrations, and local electoral and union organising 
campaigns contributed to protests against national government policies. The research and 
analysis are based on both qualitative data collected during fieldwork and on quantitative data 
from a variety of Turkish and international sources. Through an analysis of the wildcat strikes, 
the article contributes to the literature on labour movements and strikes in authoritarian contexts. 
Differently from the majority of the existing literature on this issue, it focuses on the workplace 
level rather than analysing the relations between government officials and the trade union 
confederations at the national level. By doing this, it shows that, despite the oppressive context at 
the national level, trade unions may regain power at the sectoral level. 
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This article analyses the role of local dynamics on the ability of a trade union movement to deal 
with labour conflicts at the national level. It studies the strategies of the labour unions in different 
industries in Turkey during the rule of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi, AKP) in a context of the rise of repressive policies vis-à-vis labour issues. It shows how 
local alliances make it possible for labour unions to organise strikes and gain power at the 
workplace level while authoritarian practices restrict labour rights and strikes at the national level.  
Since its arrival to power in November 2002, the AKP has gradually transformed the 
relations between employers and labour unions. The AKP government uses legal regulations 
(Çelik, 2012), state repression, police violence and intervention in the internal affairs of  trade 
unions in order to promote a type of  “preferable and acceptable trade unionism” as opposed to a 
“dangerous and extremist” one (Özveri, 2012: 254–55). Nationally, unionisation strategies and 
new inter-union alliances (with pro-AKP unions on one side and anti-AKP unions on the other) 
are built around the AKP government’s policies. The pro-AKP unions have gained power and 
have adopted more pacifist practices when there are conflicts with employers. The anti-AKP 
unions have been marginalised and have become unable to organise strikes and mass 
demonstrations. However, the study of  employer–worker relations at workplace level reveals that 
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the AKP government’s policies do not have the same consequences there. The local (sectoral or 
regional) level is not equally influenced by this state intervention. There is a plurality of  forces, 
mobilisation capacities and alliances at the local level. In the precarious sectors of  activity such as 
the textile, shipbuilding and energy sectors – characterised by subcontracting, a high risk of  
dismissal and high rates of  mortality at work – demonstrations and strikes are mainly organised 
by the marginalised trade unions. On the other hand, the pro-government trade unions are 
investing more in the new sectors of  activity that developed throughout the 2000s such as 
forestry, communication, municipal and general services, banking and finance; these sectors are 
characterised by an increase in the employment rate, increase in incomes, and expansion in the 
number of  companies). The local level reveals itself  to be a relatively more autonomous space for 
the labour movement. A repressed actor of  the trade union field at the national level can be the 
dominant actor at the local level, allowing it to obtain a larger volume of  resources and more 
influence during collective bargaining processes. How do these marginal and sometimes even 
criminalised trade unions obtain rights and reinforce themselves at the workplace level? To what 
extent do the local configurations play a role in labour mobilisations and wildcat strikes in a 
context of  repression of  social movements? 
The period of  our research – between 2012 and 2016 – is interesting for three reasons. First, 
the AKP government’s policies concerning industrial relations included a high level of  control on 
trade unions and labour conflicts (Çelik, 2012; Özveri, 2012). Second, the power balance inside 
the trade union field (Béroud, 2015) was transformed during this period. Third, the trade union 
field became more and more polarised, and the pro-AKP trade unions gained power over the 
anti-AKP unions (Erdinç, 2018). This article argues that local alliances made it possible for 
workers and trade unions to organise strikes at the workplace level and to gain power while the 
authoritarian practices restricted labour rights and strikes at the national level.  
The case of  the metal industry in Bursa is not the only example of  labour mobilisation 
changing the power balance in labour movements under repression. Morocco has, since 2011, 
witnessed the development of  new forms of  organising and mobilising employees around 
labour-related demands outside unions and legal frameworks (Zeroual and Lefnatsa, 2019). 
Through a focus on the actions of  teachers in the public education sector, who were hired on a 
contractual basis, the Moroccan case also shows how these non-union dynamics confront the 
neo-liberal policies and austerity measures in the country. As to the labour movements in Algeria, 
it is the autonomous trade unions that participated in the space of  contestation during the 1990s 
and 2000s (Beddoubia, 2019). The autonomous trade unions have managed to go beyond 
corporatist demands to reinforce a movement that focuses on questions of  democratic change in 
the context of  the Arab Spring. The wildcat strikes in Turkey enabled workers who were 
members of  a pro-employer and pro-government trade union to mobilise and protest against the 
aggravation of  conditions or unrightful dismissals. 
This research is based on fieldwork conducted in Turkey between 2012 and 2016. This 
comprised 111 semi-structured interviews at the three main trade union confederations and their 
affiliates in different industries, observations in trade unions, and the analysis of  the local, 
national and international press, trade union publications and legal regulations, court reports and 
witnesses’ declarations. For the quantitative data, mainly the official statistics of  the Ministry, 
European Union (EU) Development Reports, and reports of  labour unions’ research institutes 
were used. The choice of  the strikes in the metal industry as a case study in this article stems 
from their being among the most influential strikes in Turkey during the 2000s because of  their 
scale, results and extent of  media coverage. 
This article has three main objectives. First, it aims to analyse the relations between trade 
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unions and the political power (political parties, government actors, deputies) (see also in this 
regard: Levitsky, 2003; Yousfi, 2015). Second, it seeks to understand how the social protest actors 
(more precisely the trade unions) construct alliances at the local level. Third, it contributes to the 
scholarship on social movements in repressive contexts. The existing literature on this subject 
focuses on the national level and on the impact of  government policies on trade union strategies, 
ignoring the sectoral and regional contexts (Gobe, 2008; Çelik, 2015). This article shows that 
when we switch our focus, we discover that government policies do not have the same 
consequences on all sectors and regions. A different power balance between hegemonic actors 
and trade unions can be found. Discriminated-against and criminalised trade unions can gain 
power through workplace demonstrations, wildcat strikes and local political alliances. This article 
will first explain briefly the conceptual framework of  our study. The second part will analyse two 
main instruments used by the AKP government in order to control and govern the trade unions 
and industrial relations. The third part will focus on the strikes in the metal industry in Bursa. 
The last part will study the consequences on the labour movement and on trade union practices. 
The conclusion will provide further discussion on industrial relations in an authoritarian context 
(Allal, Scala and Longuenesse, 2019). 
 
 
Conceptual Framework  
According to the legal definition, a wildcat strike is a work stoppage that occurs during the term 
of a collective bargaining agreement without approval of union leadership and in violation of a 
no-strike clause (USLegal, undated). Such strikes generally occur because labour has specific 
problems or concerns that have not been satisfactorily addressed by employers, or workers feel 
that union leaders are not acting in the best interests of the union members. In the United States 
legal system, it is also referred to as an “outlaw strike” (USLegal, undated). Alvin Gouldner 
(1954) describes a wildcat strike as a strike developed out of a violation of previously agreed 
conditions between the workers and the employers which comprised part of the workers’ 
expectations. The formal issues of the dispute usually appear to be the displacement of a 
conciliatory official union leadership by a more aggressive informal leadership that is more 
representative of the workers’ state of emotional tension (Gouldner, 1954).  
This article aims to contribute to the existing literature on labour studies in two ways: the 
discussion around the concept of  wildcat strike and the focus on the micro-level, in particular on 
the workplace level. Differently from the dominant literature on labour mobilisations under 
authoritarianism (Gobe, 2008; Hibou, 2011; Çelik, 2012), this article follows the invitation of  
Allal, Scala and Longuenesse (2019) who propose a rather micro-level analysis through a study of  
workplace relations, precarity and working conditions in different industries (Erdinç, 2018; 
Beddoubia, 2019; Spyridakis, 2019; Zeroual and Lefnatsa, 2019). We will show that authoritarian 
practices have different consequences at sectoral and regional levels. An oppressed trade union 
can play a powerful role in some industries depending on other factors such as local alliances, 
workers’ conditions and participation, and local politics. 
The research on wildcat strikes in the automobile industry in the United States and in Great 
Britain during World War 2 lets us understand different ways to prevent and obstruct these kinds 
of  strikes by the political power or the contested trade union leaders (Scott and Homans, 1947; 
Eldridge and Cameron, 1964; Handsaker and Handsaker, 1973). Wildcat strikes in Britain, for 
example, were considered as an “anarchical type of  protest”; they were condemned morally, and 
the striking workers were accused of  not being loyal to existing collective agreements and of  not 
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respecting the industrial order and peace (Eldridge and Cameron, 1964: 33–36). 
The research on wildcat strikes in authoritarian contexts shows how workers use this kind of  
collective action when the conventional forms of  participation or union representation are no 
longer possible (Zetka, 1992; Anner and Xiangmin, 2016). In their work on wildcat strikes in 
Vietnam, Anner and Xiangmin (2016) show that workers use wildcat strikes in order to place 
pressure on official trade union representatives and leaders (which the authors call harmonious 
unions) in order to make them act on behalf  of  their affiliates. According to their study, the 
wildcat strikes in Vietnam not only provided benefits to workers but also affected state policy and 
engendered state transformations that shaped employment relations institutions more broadly, 
whether through minimum wage adjustments or labour law reforms that provided greater voice 
for workers at the firm level (Anner and Xiangmin, 2016: 21–23). Zetka’s (1992) work on wildcat 
strikes in the United States between 1946 and 1963 explains the importance of  the dynamics of  
the automobile industry in the success of  wildcat strikes. He states one factor that could explain 
this success may be the high levels of  centralisation and interdependence among production 
processes in the auto industry. This grants workers great power to jeopardise capital. However, in 
less interdependent processes (where the workers cannot coordinate their activities to accomplish 
their tasks), wildcat strikes may not be viable and the workers may not be able to take collective 
control of  their work and the work procedures through strikes (Zetka, 1992: 216–24). Thus, the 
sectorial dynamics are decisive in order to analyse the collective action possibilities and the 
conditions that facilitate a wildcat strike. Moreover, in an oppressive working environment, the 
unofficial becomes a gesture of  defiance and a protest against the fact that someone has broken 
the existing rules (Zetka, 1992: 36). 
In addition to the discussion on wildcat strikes, this article aims to point out the importance 
of  local workplace dynamics in understanding the possibilities of  wildcat strikes in an oppressive 
context. The article thus pays particular attention to the local working conditions, the structure 
and nature of  the job, working hours, employer–employee proximity, trade union membership 
density in the sector, political participation of  the workers, and government oppression and 
control in the industry. In this sense, the article articulates the research on sociology of  work and 
employment (Bevort and Jobert, 2011) and sociology of  labour movements (Nowak, Dutta and 
Birke, 2018). Based on a study of  the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) in France, Karel 
Yon (2011) states that the fact that the trade unions are organised in a decentralised way 
guarantees the creation and coexistence of  different union actions and styles, including those that 
are more critical or intellectual. Thus, switching the levels of  analysis in order to see different 
configurations on the micro level lets us find different styles of  labour mobilisation (Revel, 1996). 
Moreover, recent research on authoritarian regimes shows how new forms of  collective action 
are gaining ground under authoritarian regimes (Bayat, 2006; Scott, 2008; Uysal, 2017). Graeme 
Robertson (2007) studied strikes and labour organisations in hybrid regimes, in particular in post-
war Russia, after the Cold War period. He shows that despite the introduction of  electoral 
competition, autonomous democratic organisations representing labour are not well developed. 
However, this situation doesn’t make workers’ protests disappear completely. On the contrary:  
 
The greater the hardship, or the perception of injustice, the more likely there is to be wildcat action, 
that is protest activity beyond the framework of the official unions. Where deprivation is worse, 
official efforts to prevent protest are less likely to be successful (Robertson, 2007: 787).  
 
However, Robertson states that in order to understand the wildcat strikes in hybrid regimes, he 
lacks relevant data concerning the workplace level and the variations or regularities between the 
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national and the workplace levels (Robertson, 2007: 783). 
Thus in this article, the case of  the wildcat strikes in the metal industry in Turkey under the 
AKP government will be studied from two dimensions: the political power and the employers’ 
strategies in order to prevent or delegitimise wildcat strikes (second part of  the article) and the 




Labour Rights under AKP Rule 
According to the annual report of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), freedom 
of association and collective agreements declined between 2010 to 2013 (ITUC, 2013). In this 
article, we will focus on two main instruments used by the AKP government: creation of a “good 
unionism” as opposed to a “marginal” one through discourse, and intervention in internal affairs 
of the trade unions. We will start by giving a brief summary of the trade union confederations 
analysed in the article and the legal regulations in force between 2012 and 2016. 
 
Brief information on the trade union confederations analysed in the article and the 
legal regulations in force between 2012 and 2016 
The trade union field in Turkey is composed of three main trade union confederations coming 
from three different political families. The Confederation of Trade Unions of Turkey (Türkiye 
İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Türk-İş), founded in 1952, is from a nationalist/centrist 
tendency. The Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları 
Konfederasyonu, DİSK), founded in 1967, comes from a socialist/social-democratic tradition. 
The Confederation of Real Trade Unions (Hak İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Hak-İş), 
founded in 1976, is from a conservative/Islamic family. Türk-İş has the largest number of 
members followed by Hak-İş and DİSK. In order to conclude a collective agreement in a 
company, a union must recruit 50 per cent plus one of the workers at workplace level and 3 per 
cent of the workers in the entire sector on the national level (Law 6356, 2012). A worker must be 
a union member or must pay a fee to the union in order to benefit from a collective agreement 
signed between the union and the employer. The overall trade union density in Turkey is around 
11 per cent according to official statistics declared by the Ministry of Labour Affairs and Social 
Security in July 2016 (Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı [Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security], 2016). 
Having explained the structure of  the trade union field, we will now move on to explain 
labour rights under AKP rule, with a focus on government policies in order to control and 
transform the trade unions and the labour movements. 
 
“Good unionism” versus “marginal unionism”  
The construction of hegemony (in the Gramscian sense) goes through a discourse on national 
security, but also on growth and development (Gambetti, 2009). “Good unionism” is based on 
several criteria regularly used in the speeches of former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
(now President of the Republic) and government representatives. Avoiding the organisation of 
demonstrations and strikes, loving one’s homeland, ensuring the development of the country, 
and building good relations with employers and the state are the three main characteristics of an 
“acceptable trade union” according to the AKP government (Özveri, 2012). 
First, “a good trade unionist” does not protest in the streets. Street demonstrations and 
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collective action such as strikes are part of  the “illegal activities of  marginal unions” (Özveri, 
2012). The continuity of  public services and national development motivates this rejection, as 
illustrated in speeches by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. On 14 March 2008, at the Gazi University in 
Ankara, Tayyip Erdoğan declared:  
 
They invented a new thing now, a slowdown. It’s completely illegal. It’s forbidden; you cannot do 
that. No article allows you to do that. Imagine, they are slowing down their work in a hospital 
where five people are waiting. For two hours, these five people will have to wait. Now, do you 
know under which conditions they had arrived? Think also about bus stations and road transport. 
Cars will have to wait. Who will pay for the gasoline of the car that my citizen will have spent? Can 
you accept such a practice in the framework of a democratic, secular and social state of law when 
you know that we have all these problems in our cities? (Erdoğan, 2008, n.p.).  
 
Moreover, during a speech on 30 May 2012, Erdoğan spoke about the strike of workers of 
Turkish Airlines (Türk Hava Yolları, THY), launched on 15 May 2012:  
 
This strike is illegal. But it would be the same thing if it was a legal strike. Imagine what will happen 
if the strike lasts a long time. Who will pay the cost? Who will be in trouble? The nation, the nation 
will pay. THY is a strategic institution. All kinds of problems concerning this strategic institution 
are likely to harm the nation and give rise to a very serious decline in our country. I do not think we 
should let them prepare for the conditions of this decline (Erdoğan, 2012: n.p.). 
 
The second point concerns building good relations with employers and state actors. Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan’s speech on 26 September 2013 in Ankara explains the type of  unionism the 
government wants:  
 
We have our own history, our own tradition, our own culture of professional relations. We are 
against the distinction between employee and employer; we want to put an end to this distinction 
between employer and worker. We are struggling to set up a road companionship system. Because, 
no life is possible neither without the employer nor without the employee. Road companions are 
not two rival sides. They are partners who walk the same path, have the same destiny, share the 
difficulties and benefits. ... These two must not behave like two enemies who can never get along 
and agree; this is not useful for professional relations professionals, neither for the country nor for 
the nation (Erdoğan, 2013: n.p.). 
 
This discourse aims to reduce the conflicts between different interests. The importance of  
an inter-class reconciliation for national development is thus underlined through these speeches 
(Çelik, 2015).  
 
Government intervention in the internal affairs of unions  
Another tool of the AKP government is direct or indirect intervention into trade union affairs. 
Two examples are useful in order to understand the direct and indirect mechanisms of the 
government’s intervention in the internal affairs of trade unions: the case of the aviation industry 
union (Hava-İş) and the chemical and petroleum industry union (Petrol-İş). 
On 29 May 2012, a law banning strikes in the aviation sector was passed in the National 
Assembly (T24, 2012). Earlier that year, a conflict had arisen during the collective bargaining 
process between Turkish Airlines and Hava-İş, an affiliate of  Türk-İş. Following the enactment 
of  the new law, the employees of  Turkish Airlines protested the restriction. In the following days, 
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Turkish Airlines sacked 305 employees who had participated in the protest. Meanwhile, the 
company and the trade union failed to reach agreement at the end of  the collective bargaining 
process. Thus, the trade union began to strike on 15 May 2013, calling for the reinstatement of  
dismissed workers and the preparation of  a new collective agreement. During the strike, on 7 
December 2013, Hava-İş was to hold its general congress in Istanbul to elect its new central 
committee. According to the declarations of  the trade union representatives and workers, the 
management of  Turkish Airlines threatened the workers with dismissal if  they supported the 
present union president who had launched the strike.1 Two candidates withdrew, and another 
candidate made an alliance with the pro-AKP candidate for presidency of  the union. Thus, the 
president who launched the strike lost the election and the candidate close to the AKP was 
elected as the new president of  Hava-İş. Clearly, AKP networks played a decisive role in the 
election of  the new executive committee of  the trade union (Evrensel, 2013). Upon the arrival of  
the new head of  the union, on 20 December 2013, the union declared the end of  the strike and 
signed a collective agreement with Turkish Airlines according to the terms rejected by the former 
central committee (Bloomberg, 2013). The workers on strike were only partially reinstated to 
their jobs at Turkish Airlines. During our interviews with trade union representatives, the change 
of  the central committee of  the union was considered as an “operation for the pacification of  
the union”,2 “an invasion by the AKP”,3 and “the beginning of  a period of  declining struggles”.4 
Another example is the case of  Petrol-İş, a trade union in the chemicals and petroleum 
industry and an affiliate of  Türk-İş. A union representative explains the transformations in the 
executive committee of  the union in the period 2013 and 2015:  
 
In our local branches, employers started to recruit workers close to the AKP, even sometimes party 
members who do not have the required qualifications for the job. These workers are then 
encouraged to present themselves as candidates in the union elections or to vote for candidates 
close to the AKP. This situation led to a change in the central committees of our union. There are 
therefore more and more new union leaders and members supporting the AKP. These executives 
recruit administrative and permanent staff close to the AKP as well, while sacking or forcing to 
leave socialist and social-democrat staff members in the union. I’m thinking of quitting soon, too. 
We are no longer fighting against employers. We are becoming less and less autonomous in our 
decisions and training and educational activities for workers.5 
 
In this way, the intervention of the AKP transforms indirectly or directly the central committees 
of the unions. The new members have different convictions and traditions than the previous 
committee members, and this changes the practices, activities and strategies of the trade union. 
The trade unions’ collective action repertories change (Tilly, 1978); they become less conflictual 
and more consensual. 
However, these transformations on the national level have different consequences at the 
local level. Some sectors and industries appear to have different dynamics, and trade unions find a 
place to organise strikes and protests at the workplace level. The following section will show how 
the wildcat strikes at the local level have led the workers to protest unrightful dismissals by 
employers, government repression of  labour movements and the pro-government and pro-
employer trade union to whom they are affiliated.  
 
1 Union representative 1, interview, Istanbul, 24 December 2015. 
2 Union representative 2, interview, Istanbul, 27 December 2015. 
3 Union representative 3, interview, Istanbul, 12 August 2014. 
4 Union representative 4, interview, Istanbul, 12 August 2014. 
5 Union representative 5, interview, Istanbul, 25 December 2015. 
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Local Dynamics as a Resource for Collective Action: The Case of the Metal 
Workers’ Strikes in Bursa 
It was explained in the first part of this article how the AKP government is reconfiguring the 
trade union field. In this context, some trade unions operate in a way that ensures they obtain 
state benefits such as (municipal resources, European Union projects, indirect financial resources, 
and direct or indirect support by AKP government officials in recruiting workers in both public 
and private sectors. To achieve this, they do not consider the demands of the workers, and sign 
agreements that give rise to worker discontent (Erdinç, 2018). The construction of good relations 
with employers and the discourse on the importance of “social dialogue” have started to be the 
rule for trade unions (Erdinç and Visier, 2018). Hence, wildcat strikes became one of the 
strategies for workers to protest the terms of collective workplace agreements signed by their 
union. 
Pierre Bourdieu (1984) underlines the importance of  the implantation of  a company in local 
social life. He states that the objective relations that exist in the workplace shape the protest 
capacities of  workers. The local level is thus important when analysing the mobilisation strategies 
of  labour unions. A focus on the metal industry in Bursa, northwest Turkey, will let us examine 
the role of  local actors. This part of  the article will show that the inter-organisational alliances 
and specific sectoral configurations in the metal industry in Bursa enable the workers to gain 
power over dominant actors in the trade union field. This analysis will help us understand how 
the workers could find a way to protest and mobilise in the context of  an authoritarian regime, 
where some of  the trade union representatives are pro-government. These pro-government 
representatives aim to create good relations with employers in order to avoid industrial conflicts 
and unrest in the country.  
 
Industrial relations and collective bargaining in the metal industry in Bursa 
The metal industry in Turkey has been marked by several wildcat strikes between 2012 and 2016. 
Thousands of workers in the automobile companies in Bursa have refused to accept the clauses 
of a new collective agreement. (See Table 1 for a list of international car companies with local 
operations.) These mobilisations were organised without the support or approval of the union to 
which the workers were affiliated, in this case Türk Metal, affiliated to the nationalist/centrist 
Türk-İş). How can one explain the conflicts and wildcat strikes despite the collective agreement 
signed by the majority trade union and, more importantly, despite the repression and the 
restrictions on the right to strike in Turkey? 
The history of  the conflicts between employers and workers in the metal industry in Bursa 
goes back to November 2012. The first demonstrations were organised by workers affiliated to 
the left-wing union Birleşik Metal-İş at the Renault plant (partner of  the Turkish company, 
Oyak), and then extended into other automotive companies in Bursa. The declaration of  Birleşik 
Metal-İş on 4 December 2012 lets us follow the background of  the conflict:  
 
On 12th of November, workers who are working in the 16.00–24.00 shift of the Renault factory, 
stopped work at 18.30 and gathered in the factory square. Workers had two main demands: first, 
the revision of the collective agreement draft and second, the resigning from Türk Metal and [for] 
Türk Metal to leave the workplace. The demonstration, which started at the assembly line, spread to 
other divisions. The demonstration continued until midnight. Later in the night, the factory 
manager came to the factory and [said] that he wants to talk with a delegation of five workers, but 
he also threatened workers by saying that they should start production in the meantime, otherwise 
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he won’t be responsible [for] what will happen. Workers didn’t go back to production, and they 
waited for the workers of the 24.00–08.00 shift. But factory management was afraid that the 
demonstration will spread to next shift, too, and they cancelled the 24.00–08.00 shift. And they 
tried to prevent workers to meet each other. But workers didn’t leave the plant and some of the 
workers from other shifts and workers from different workplaces in the industrial zone came in 
front of the factory to support the striking workers. Around 24.00, the police intervened and told 
the workers that according to law it is forbidden to demonstrate after 24.00 and wanted to prevent 
the workers waiting outside to meet the workers who will leave the factory. Some of the workers 
argued with the police and they [said] that they don’t want to leave the factory. When the next shift 
came to work, 23 workers learned that they were dismissed. Also 10 other workers from the 
morning shift who came in front of the factory in order to show their support during the 
demonstration, were dismissed, too (Birleşik Metal-İş, 2012). 
 
 
Table 1. Production plants of multinational automobile companies in Bursa and Kocaeli 
Name of company Date plant established Capital (x 1000 TL, in 2007) 
AIOS (Isuzu) 1966 25 419 
BMC 1966 500 000 
Ford Otosan 1983, 2001 350 910 
Hattat Tarım (Valtra) 2002 40 000 
Honda Türkiye 1997 180 000 
Hyundai Assan 1997 627 235 
Karsan (Peugeot) 1966 260 000 
MAN Türkiye 1966 65 00 
Mercedes Benz Türk 1968, 1985 275 00 
Otokar (Land Rover) 1963 24 000 
Oyak Renault 1971 323 300 
Temsa Global (Mitsubishi) 1987, 2008 210 000 
Tofaş (Fiat) 1971 500 000 
Toyota 1994 150 165 
 Source: Birleşik Metal-İş (2015).  
 
 
However, the demonstrations in 2012 were not as influential as those organised through 2014 
and 2015 (Güler and Tokol, 2016). In December 2014, Türk Metal and the Turkish Metal 
Industry Employers’ Union (Türkiye Metal Sanayicileri Sendikası, MESS) signed a collective 
agreement for the period 2014–2017. Türk Metal is an affiliate of Türk-İş, which has a nationalist 
tendency and is known to be close to the government and to employers. Çelik-İş, a conservative 
confederation and an affiliate of Hak-İş, is also known to be close to the government; it signed 
the same agreement, representing a small number of the companies in which it had most of the 
workers. Birleşik Metal-İş, on the other hand, declared itself against this collective agreement. 
Two clauses caused the main discontent: the conditions for the increase in wages and the 
duration of the collective agreement.6 The agreement provided for a wage increase proportional 
 
6 Birleşik Metal-İş report (internal document, collected by the author during fieldwork), 2014. 
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to the inflation rate. However, in the metallurgical sector in Turkey, there is a great wage gap 
between experienced workers and workers recruited from 2000 onwards, which represents 70 per 
cent of workers working in the whole sector. Thus, Birleşik Metal-İş demanded a lower increase 
for workers who have higher wages and a higher increase for those who have lower wages. The 
collective agreement was to be valid for a period of three years. However, the duration of 
collective agreements signed in Turkey in the metallurgical sector was generally two years. This 
situation restricted the bargaining capacity of the workers and made the workers lose their regular 
wage increase every two years. 
 
Wildcat strikes 
In this context, on 29 January 2015, Birleşik Metal-İş called for a strike in twenty-two companies 
in the metal industry (DİSK, 2015). Workers at other automobile companies affiliated to the Fiat-
Chrysler Automobiles group (FCA) also participated in the demonstrations. Sixteen more 
companies joined the call to strike on 19 February. In January 2015, the executive committee of 
DİSK, a left-wing trade union confederation with both socialist and social-democratic affiliates, 
declared its support for the workers on strike. However, the strike of the metalworkers, now 
joined by 15 000 workers from forty-eight plants, was suspended for two months by the 
government on 30 January 2015, on the grounds of “being a threat against national security”. 
This was the seventh strike that was suspended by the government in thirteen years (SiyasiHaber, 
2015).7 These wildcat strikes in Bursa were a way that the metalworkers could protest their 
conditions at the workplace level. They had consequences in the whole trade union field by 
influencing the power balance between pro- and anti-government and employer trade unions. 
The conflict between the employers and the workers in the metal industry in Bursa reached 
its peak in April 2015, when Bosch company and Türk Metal union signed a collective agreement. 
It is important to point out the influence of  this collective agreement on the beginning of  the 
wildcat strikes. The reason why Türk Metal – considered as an acceptable (Özveri, 2012) or a 
harmonious (Anner and Xiangmin, 2016) union – had to sign a collective agreement with a 
higher wage increase was to prevent its members from quitting the union and joining its main 
opposition, Birleşik Metal-İş. A number of  Bosch workers had done so during November and 
December 2014. The two unions were waiting for the Labour Court’s decision to see which 
union now held the majority and thus was eligible to sign agreements in the factory. In this 
context, the new collective agreement signed by Türk Metal offered a higher wage increase. 
When the news of  the collective agreement signed between Bosch and Türk Metal spread to 
other factories in the industrial zone, Renault workers affiliated to Türk Metal claimed the same 
rights and conditions as those proposed in this collective agreement. However, they were 
informed that they had to wait for the new collective bargaining period in 2017. This triggered a 
series of  demonstrations in April 2015, organised at the Renault plant and supported by workers 
in other metal factories. The demonstrations and the strikes of  the workers were considered as 
“illegal” by the Union of  Turkish Metal Industry Employers (Güler and Tokol, 2016). The 
workers on strike were sacked by the Renault company. In order to protest this decision, other 
workers joined the protests. A massive wildcat strike organised by Renault workers in Bursa in 
May 2015 started without any prior approval of  their union, Türk Metal. Thousands of  workers 
in other multinational and local metal factories and automobile companies in Bursa started to join 
the demonstrations and the strikes (Güler and Tokol, 2016). From 14 May 2015 to 1 June 2015, 
 
7 For more information on the suspension of strikes in Turkey, see Çelik (2008), Caniklioğlu (2013) and 
Koçak (2014).  
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the wildcat strikes continued at Renault, Ford, Türk Traktör, Tofaş, Fiat and many other local 
companies in the metal industry in Bursa, and spread to other cities around Bursa. Thus, the 
wildcat strikes appeared to be an alternative way to protest the collective agreement signed by the 
pro-employer trade union at the local level.  
After having explained the background of  the labour conflicts in Bursa, we can now analyse 
the consequences of  these strikes on the power relations in the metal industry. 
 
Reconfiguring the power balance between trade unions: what consequences for the 
regulation of labour conflicts? 
The wildcat strikes and workers’ demonstrations have led to changes in the balance of power 
within the trade union field. The non-functioning of the social dialogue system and its 
instrumentalisation by the AKP government have led to the weakening of the legitimacy of the 
dominant actors in the metal industry in Bursa – that is, pro-government trade unions and 
employers’ associations.  
The president of  Türk Metal was booed by the union’s affiliate workers during his visit to 
Bursa at the time of  the mobilisations. The union has started to lose its members as the workers 
on strike left Türk Metal. Some of  them joined the Birleşik Metal-İş and others declared that they 
no longer wished to join a trade union, claiming that “trade unions do not listen to the demands 
of  the workers and they only care about their own interest and benefits from the state and 
employer”.8 According to official statistics, from January to July 2015 the number of  Türk Metal 
union members has declined from 177 125 to 166 250. Birleşik Metal-İş has gained 5 471 
members, bringing its membership to 31 066 workers (Güler and Tokol, 2016). Türk Metal lost 
its majority at the Renault plant in Bursa, as Birleşik Metal-İş obtained the majority in some of  
the companies thanks to its support of  the striking workers.  
One of  the consequences of  the strikes on employers and car companies was the 
questioning of  the legitimacy and relevance of  the Turkish Metal Industry Employers’ Union. 
One of  our interviewees has informed us that from the first day of  the strike some companies 
decided to leave the MESS and signed separate collective agreements by negotiating directly with 
Birleşik Metal-İş, which was supporting the workers on strike.9 The workers then declared the 
end of  the strike and went back to production. 
Another consequence of the wildcat strike was the improvement in the workers’ working and 
living conditions. Table 2 shows the difference between the wage rise according to the agreement 
signed by Türk Metal and the wage rise according to the collective agreement signed after the 
strikes. It is clear that there has been a positive evolution in the workers’ conditions at the 
company level after the strikes. The companies who signed a new agreement with the striking 
workers (independently from MESS or Türk Metal) accepted a wage rise for the workers. Thus, it 
is possible to state that the local relations and the wildcat strikes have assured a certain type of 
autonomy for the workers, trade union representatives and employers at the workplace level. 
Even though Birleşik Metal-İş is not capable of concluding collective agreements in workers’ 
favour at the national level and is subject to anti-union discrimination, at the local level in Bursa 
the wildcat strikes have enabled the trade union to negotiate in more favourable conditions with 
the employer and eventually obtain a higher wage rise for the workers. This lets us state that the 
balance of power in the trade union field is different at the national level and at the sectoral level. 
Even though Türk Metal is the dominant trade union, holding the majority of union members in 
 
8 Union representative 6, interview, Istanbul, 25 December 2015. 
9 Union representative 7, interview, Istanbul, 21 September 2015. 
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the metal sector in Turkey, Birleşik Metal-İş managed to recruit members and become the 
dominant trade union in the metal industry in the city of Bursa. Moreover, the employer 
organisation MESS, dominant in the employers’ field, has lost part of its membership among the 
companies in Bursa. The reshaping of the power balance thus concerns not only trade unions but 
also employers’ organisations. The wildcat strikes have thus triggered a modification of the power 




Table 2. Comparison between wage increases, by company 
 
Name of company 
Wage increase after the strikes  
(per month) 
Wage increase according to 
prior collective agreement 
Delphi 252 TL 125 TL 
Mahle 281 TL 140 TL 
Schneider Elektrik 268 TL 184 TL 
ALSTOM 260 TL 195 TL 
Schneider Enerji 247 TL 185 TL 
BEKAERT 305 TL 210 TL 
ABB 253 TL 185 TL 
DOSTEL 204 TL 148 TL 




To sum up, this article has analysed two main dimensions of wildcat strikes. The first dimension 
concerns the grounds on which employers, the political power and official unions condemn the 
wildcat strikes, both morally and legally. Differently from the workers on strike during World 
War 2 in the US and British automobile industry (Scott and Homans, 1947; Zetka, 1992), the 
workers on strike in Turkey under AKP rule in the 2000s were not the elite or the more 
advantaged group of workers. The metal workers participating in the wildcat strikes protested the 
clauses and the conditions of the collective agreement signed between the employer and the 
official trade union. At first, their aim was to push the existing representative trade union to 
provide better working conditions and wages. However, in the context of an oppressive employer 
and government, and a non-responsive official trade union, the workers aimed to change 
completely the existing industrial order by changing their union affiliation. The wildcat strikes of 
metalworkers in Bursa revealed two problems concerning the labour conflicts in the metal 
industry in Turkey. In the absence of collective bargaining mechanisms that operate in 
accordance with international conventions and constraints of European legal regulations, state 
actors, employers and trade unions close to the government weighed more heavily in collective 
bargaining processes. The pro-government and pro-employer trade unions holding the majority 
at the workplace begin to lose legitimacy among their members, and therefore their ability to 
negotiate with employers. Thus, when we come back to our main argument, we can state that the 
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The second contribution of  our article concerns the impacts and the frequency of  the 
wildcat strikes on national, local and workplace levels. Following Robertson’s (2007) proposition 
in his research on strikes and labour organisations in hybrid regimes, we have analysed the metal 
industry through a micro-level analysis based on several companies in Bursa, a city in north-
western Turkey. First, the case of  Turkey lets us analyse labour movements and strikes in 
authoritarian contexts that we can define as hybrid regimes (Levitsky, 2003), competitive 
authoritarianisms (Levitsky and Way, 2011) or illiberal democracies (Zakaria, 1997). The case of  
the metal industry lets us state three main points. In this sense, the article first shows that 
government repression of  the labour movement does not have the same consequences in all 
industries, all regions and all trade unions. Spaces for labour protests and strikes are still seen in 
precarious sectors and in major industrial zones. The marginalised trade unions can gain 
influence at the workplace level during the collective bargaining process in multinational and local 
companies. Second, the article lets us understand how the local dynamics reinforced the 
marginalised and banned activities of  the trade unions and workers in an authoritarian context. 
Thus, the local level (with its resources and actors) is used as a stake to put pressure on the 
employers and to overcome government repression. Third, this article has let us explain what 
happens to the official trade union and to the employer during and after the wildcat strike period. 
In a context when the behaviour of  organisations nominally representing labour is of  particular 
interest because hierarchical unions are a frequent inheritance from authoritarian regimes 
(Robertson, 2007: 781), the analysis of  how the marginalised and criminalised trade unions and 
their affiliates survive through local political alliances and wildcat strikes enlightens the problems 
of  labour representation in oppressive industrial orders. 
In conclusion, we can state that in order to understand why wildcat strikes are rare and in 
which conditions they have an opportunity to occur and to succeed in their demands, a multi-
level analysis is crucial. Thus, this article invites us to study other industries and sectors. A 
comparison between highly unionised sectors such as mining, energy or municipal services and 
less unionised sectors such as construction or textile could provide insight into the conditions 
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